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THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION OF LABOR UNIONS
CONSIDERED IN CONJUNCTION WITH UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICES WHICH RESTRAIN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE
William H. Crabtree*
This article will discuss the antitrust exemption accorded labor
unions. It will also relate the provisions of Federal law defining as unfair
labor practices labor conduct which restrains interstate commerce.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
ACCORDED LABOR UNIONS
The present antitrust exemption does not accord labor unions a
blanket exemption for offenses committed under the Sherman Act. There
is still a specified area in which unions can be held accountable.
Even before the enactment of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia
Acts not all union activities which adversely affected commerce were
subject to the restraint of the Sherman Act. Only those union activities
resulting from a combination and conspiracy to restrain interstate com-
merce were prohibited by the Act. This elementary observation is made
since many of the union strikes in the early period of the labor move-
ment were for the purpose of organizing the workers in an entire industry
and bringing them into the membership of the union. One of the essential
features of those strikes was the attempt to eliminate the competition
of non-union goods. This was often accomplished through the employ-
ment of a secondary consumer boycott, which frequently had the effect
of restraining interstate commerce.
The earlier strikes of labor unions, taking the form of work stoppages
until the employer accepted the union's demand for better wages and
conditions of employment, clearly resulted in a stoppage of production.
There is a doubt, absent a specific intent to restrain interstate com-
merce, whether this activity would violate the Sherman Act.
The Sherman Act was passed in 1890. In 1908 it fully applied to
the activities of a labor organization in the famous Danbury Hatters
case (Loewe v. Lawler).' The Supreme Court held that a combination of
labor organizations and the members thereof to compel a manufacturer
to unionize his shop through the employment of a boycott, which pre-
vented the sale of his products in the other states, was a combination in
restraint of commerce within the meaning of the act.
Congress as the result of this and other decisions was asked to
*LL.B. 1948, Vanderbilt University; previously a trial attorney with the
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice, and Associate Counsel
of the Judiciary Committee of the United States House of Representatives. A mem-
ber of the Tennessee Bar Association, Mr. Crabtree is in charge of the Antitrust
Division of the Law Department of the Westinghouse Corporation.1208 U.S. 274 (1908).
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exempt unions from the coverage of the antitrust laws. In 1914, six years
after the Danbury Hatters decision, Congress passed the Clayton Act.
The Clayton Act amended the Sherman Act in three respects, which
have been important to labor. First, the Clayton Act permitted private
parties to secure injunctions against continued violations of the Sherman
Act (many proceedings against labor unions have been based upon private
injunction suits). Secondly, it purported in Section 20 to regulate the
issuance of injunctions in labor cases. Thirdly, in Section 6 it appeared
to state the position of organized labor under the Sherman Act (the
labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce).
Section 6 of the Clatyon Act, although it was hailed as labor's
Magna Carta, did little to shield union activities from the full prohibitions
of the Sherman Act Section 6 did little more than give Congressional
acknowledgment to the fact that labor unions by their existence and
operation were not offenses under the Sherman Act. The same is true of
a business concern which pursues a legitimate business objective. It is a
combination but it is not an unlawful combination in restraint of trade.
Section 20 of the Clayton Act was intended in cases growing out of
a labor dispute to "eliminate government by injunction."3 In no case be-
2 Section 6 is now codified as 15 U.S.C. 17, which reads as follows:
Antitrust laws not applicable to labor organizations
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence
and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for
the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit,
or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the
members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. Oct. 15, 1914, c. 323, Sec. 6, 38 STAT.
731.
3 Section 20 is now codified as 29 U.S.C. 52, which reads as follows:
Statutory restriction of injunctive relief
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer and em-
ployees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between
persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of,
a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent
irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the
application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property
or property right must be described with particularity in the application, which must
be in writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.
And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or
persons, whether single or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment,
or from ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or
persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at any place where
any such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining
or communicating information, or from peacefully persuading any person to work
or to abstain from working; or from ceasing to patronize or to employ any party
to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful
and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or withholding from, any
person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or things of
value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes;
or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of
such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this para-
graph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States. Oct.
15, 1914, c. 323, § 20, 38 STAT. 738.
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tween "an employer and employees, or between employers and em-
ployees ... or between persons employed and persons seeking employ-
ment,.., growing out of a [labor] dispute..." was the Court authorized
to issue an injunction which prohibited "any person or persons... from
terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform any
work.., or persuading others by peaceful means so to do..."
In 1921 the Supreme Court interpreted the Clayton Act in the case
of Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering! In this case the union
employed a secondary boycott in an attempt to unionize complainant's
factory. In conjunction with its strike efforts, the union brought pressure
to bear on the manufacturer's customers. Through the employment of
a secondary boycott the union interfered with the purchase and installa-
tion of complainant's printing presses in the other states.
The Supreme Court held that the Clayton Act was not intended to
legalize a secondary boycott. The terms of the statute defining a labor
dispute ("a dispute concerning terms and conditions of employment")
was construed to confer the special privilege created by the statute only
on those employees who were actually parties to the labor dispute. Thus,
the statute was not broad enough to immunize participation in a sec-
ondary boycott in which the manufacturer's customers were threatened
and warned not to purchase or install the articles of interstate commerce.
Section 20, the Court stated, imposed "an exceptional and extraordinary
restriction upon the equity powers of the courts of the United States and
upon the general operation of the antitrust laws, a restriction in the
nature of a special privilege or immunity to a particular class... .," But
this privilege, according to the Court's interpretation, extended only to
the parties "affected in a proximate and substantial . ..sense by the
cause of dispute."'
In 1927 the Supreme Court in Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen
Stone Cutters' Assn. of North Americad had before it a union restraint
of trade in which union stonecutters refused to work on stone imported
from out of state which had been quarried by non-union labor. This was
an attempt to force building contractors to purchase only stone quarried
by union labor. As an organizational "union tactic" this might appear to
be a legitimate union objective-the elimination of competition from
the non-unionized segment of the industry. However desirable the results
might have been, the Court looked upon it as a strike "directed against
the use of the product in other states with the immediate purpose and
necessary effect of restraining future sales and shipments in interstate
commerce.. .. "
The Court relied upon the reasoning in Coronado Coal Co. v. United
Mine Workers, wherein the Court stated:
The mere reduction in the supply of an article to be shipped in
4 254U.S. 443 (1921).51d. at 471.
6 Id. at 472.
7274 U.S. 37 (1927).
8 Id. at 48.
[Vol 2, No. I
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interstate commerce by the illegal or tortious prevention of its manu-
facture or production is ordinarily an indirect and remote obstruc-
tion to that commerce. But when the intent of those unlawfully pre-
venting the manufacture or production is shown to be a restrain or
control the supply entering and moving in interstate commerce, or
the price of it in interstate markets, their action is a direct violation
of the Anti-Trust Act.'
This case might have been decided without reference to the Clayton
Act. Its reasoning seems to stem from the proposition that a work stop-
page, executed by a combination of employees, is illegal if the purpose
is to restrain interstate commerce. Thus, work stoppages for higher wages
and better conditions of employment, which are not intended to restrain
interstate commerce, would probably be lawful after a repeal of the
Clayton Act. The same would be true of a repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.
Language to this effect is found in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader," de-
cided in 1940 after the enactment of both the Clayton and the Norris-
LaGuardia Acts. Therein the Court stated:
A second significant circumstance is that this Court has never ap-
plied the Sherman Act in any case, whether or not involving labor
organizations or activities, unless the Court was of the opinion that
there was some form of restraint upon commercial competition in
the marketing of goods or services and finally this Court has refused
to apply the Sherman Act in cases like the present in which local
strikes conducted by illegal means in a production industry prevented
interstate shipment of substantial amounts of the product but in
which it was not shown that the restrictions on shipments had
operated to restrain commercial competition in some substantial
way. (Citing cases)."
The Clayton Act, within the strict employee-employer "labor dispute"
interpretation of the Duplex case, gave labor a limited exemption from
the antitrust laws. It did not give labor complete freedom to engage in
almost every sort of strike or boycott activity that it deemed appropriate.
Labor did not obtain its fullest degree of freedom until after the enact-
ment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1936 and Justice Frankfurter's de-
cision in 1941 in United States v. Hutchesot.O
The Supreme Court's refusal to give a broad interpretation to the
Clayton Act, plus the excessive use of injunctions in labor cases, prompted
the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. Section 4 (specified
labor practices which are non-enjoinable) and Section 13 (a broader
definition of a "labor dispute") were the sections of the Act which
9Ibid.
10 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
17 Id. at 495-497.
12312 U.S. 219 (1941).
1965)
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all but gave labor carte blanche in waging economic warfare. Section 1313
gave a much broader definition to the term "labor dispute" than the
definition contained in Section 20 of the Clayton Act. In this section
Congress gave complete recognition to the "stranger" type of union activi-
ty, such as the secondary boycott prohibited in the Duplex case, by which
labor could organize entire industries and establish uniform union
standards.
Section 4 prohibits injunctive restraint of any of the "self-help"
techniques growing out of a "labor dispute."'4 The "self-help" activities
which were thus immunized from injunctive restraint are:
(1) Concerted refusals to work,
(2) Joining or remaining in a union,
(3) Supporting a union or strikers financially when the supporter
13 The definition of a "labor dispute" in Section 13 is now codified as 29
U.S.C. 113 (c) which reads as follows:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms or condi-
tions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
Three years later in the Wagner Act, Congress gave a similar breadth to the
definition of a "labor dispute." This is now contained in 29 U.S.C. 152 (9) which
reads as follows:
The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or
conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons
in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or condi-
tions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
1 Section 4 is now codified as 29 U.S.C. 104 which reads as follows:
Enumeration of specific acts not subject to restraining orders or injunctions
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute (as these terms are herein defined) from doing, whether singly or
in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as is described
in section 103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or
interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance,
or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any
labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or
suit in any court of the United States or of any State;(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor
dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the acts
heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts heretofore
specified; and(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking or promise
as is described in section 103 of this title. Mar. 23, 1932, c. 90, § 4, 47 STAT. 70.
(Vol. 2, No. 1
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is interested in the labor dispute involved,
(4) Lawfully aiding anyone interested in a labor dispute, who is
party to a law suit,
(5) Publicizing a labor dispute and its details, "whether by ad-
vertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not
involving fraud or violence" a fairly comprehensive cover-
all for picketing.
(6) Assembling peaceably to organize or promote labor disputes,
(7) Stating an intention to do any of the above things, and
(8) "Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without
fraud or violence" the things detailed above, regardless of any
antiunion promises."5
The full significance of labor's immunity from the antitrust laws
after the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was at once apparent in
the opinion of Justice Frankfurter in United States v. Hutcheson. While
still a professor at Harvard Law School, Frankfurter reputedly prepared
the draft of the bill which was later introduced by Senator Norris and
Congressman LaGuardia.
It is interesting that the Hutcheson case also involved a boycott
which was similar to the boycott employed in the Duplex case. In the
Hutcheson case two unions, the Carpenters Union and the Mechanics
Union, claimed the right to perform labor on a construction project for
Anheuser Busch, Inc., in St. Louis, Missouri. The Carpenters Union
called a strike, picketed Anheuser Busch and requested through circular
letters and official publications that union members and their friends in
other states refrain from buying Anheuser Busch beer.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, held that
Congress in passing the Norris-LaGuardia Act restored "the broad pur-
pose which [it] thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act.....,11
This was accomplished by "infusing into [the Clayton Act] the
immunized trade union activities as redefined by the [Norris-LaGuardia]
Act.18 These redefined trade union activities were held to be legal, be-
cause Section 20 of the Clatyon Act "removes all such allowable conduct
from the taint of being 'a violation of any law of the United States,' in-
cluding the Sherman Law.19 The Norris-LaGuardia Act, the opinion
stated, "explicity formulated the 'public policy of the United States' in
regard to the industrial conflict, and by its light established that the al-
lowable area of union activity was not to be restricted, as it had been in
the Duplex . . .case, to an immediate employer-employee relation.""0
Thus, the result of the Hutcheson case was to make a large area of
union activity, including activity previously declared illegal under the
Sherman Act, lawful in addition to being non-enjoinable. This process of
statutory construction (the Norris-LaGuardia Act had no provision similar
to Section 20 of the Clayton Act declaring that the specified conduct
IsCHARLEs 0. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw, 187 (2d revised ed. 1958).
16312 U.S. 219 (1941).
'7Id. at 236.
18Ibid.
9Ibid.
" Id. at 231.
19651
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was not to "be considered or held to be violations of any law of the
United States") was characterized by Justice Roberts in his dissenting
opinion as "a process of construction never, as I think, heretofore in-
dulged by this court.... 21
In spite of the broad scope of the Hutcheson decision, labor unions
today do not enjoy an absolute immunity from the antitrust laws.22 Labor's
immunity does not extend to activities which are performed in concert
or in combination with non-labor groups. This was clarified in 1945 in
the case of Allen Bradley Co. v. Union No. 3 International Brotherhood
of Electrical WorkersPn In this case there was a combination and con-
spiracy between the electrical workers union and the electrical contractors
and manufacturers in New York City which had the effect of controlling
the sale and installation of all electrical equipment in the New York
City area. The combination and conspiracy was perfected to a degree that
all the electrical contractors agreed to purchase electrical equipment en-
tirely from local manufacturers who hired members of the union. The
manufacturers in turn agreed to confine their local sales to contractors
who hired members of the union. In the words of the Court these agree-
ments resulted in "industry-wide understandings, looking not merely to
terms and conditions of employment but also to price and market
control."'24
Thus, the Court held "Congress never intended that unions could,
consistently with the Sherman Act, aid non-labor groups to create busi-
ness monopolies and to control the marketing of goods and serivces."'
In defining the area of permissive union activity, which becomes
unlawful when conducted in combination with a non-labor group, the
Court stated:
Since union members can without violating the Sherman Act strike
to enforce a union boycott of goods, it is said they may settle the
strike by getting their employers to agree to refuse to buy the goods.
Employers and the union did here make bargaining agreements in
which the employers agreed not to buy goods manufactured by com-
panies which did not employ the members of local No. 3. We may
assume that such an agreement standing alone would not have
violated the Sherman Act. But it did not stand alone. It was but
one element in a far larger program in which contractors and manu-
facturers united with one another to monopolize all the business in
New York City, to bar all other business men from that area, and
2 11d. at 245.
22In Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940), the Supreme
Court held that strikers, who took possession of a hosiery factory during a protracted
sit-down strike and prevented the shipment of finished hose in interstate commerce,
did not violate the Sherman Act because there was no intent to restrain commerce.
In this case, however, the Court pointed out that Congress, although repeatedly
petitioned to exclude labor unions, "has passed no act purporting to exclude labor
unions wholly from the operation of the Act. On the contrary, Congress has re-
peatedly enacted laws restricting or purporting to curtail the application of the
Act to labor organizations and their activities, thus recognizing that to some extent
not defined they remain subject to it." (310 U.S. at 487-488).
23325 U.S. 797 (1945).
2 Id. at 799-800.
2s ld. at 808.
(Vol. 2, No. I
7
Crabtree: The Antitrust Exemption of Labor Unions Considered in Conjunction
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1965
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
to charge the public prices above a competitive level. It is true that
victory of the union in its disputes, even had the union acted alone,
might have added to the cost of goods, or might have resutled in
individual refusals of all of their employers to buy electrical equip-
ment not made by Local No. 3. So far as the union might have
achieved this result acting alone, it would have been the natural
consequence of labor union activities exempted by the Clayton Act
from the coverage of the Sherman Act Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,
supra, 503. But when the unions participated with a combination of
business men who had complete power to eliminate all competition
among themselves and to prevent all competition from others, a
situation was created not included within the exemptions of the
Clatyon and Norris-LaGuardia Acts.
Had the union not acted in combination with entrepreneurs, its
conduct would have been lawfuL The Court conceded that "the means
adopted to contribute to the combination's purpose fall squarely within
the 'specified acts' declared by § 20 [of the Clayton Act] not to be
violations of federal law."' 7
Thus, from an analysis of the decisions it can be stated that labor
unions have been granted an immunity for participation in any of the
"self-help" techniques outlined in either the Clayton Act or the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, which grow out of a "labor dispute" (according to the
Norris-Laguardia definition of that term), provided the union acts in
its own self-interest and not in combination with a non-labor group l
26 Id. at 809.
2 Id. at 807. In commenting upon the history which prompted passage of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court stated:
"This Court later declined to interpret the Clayton Act as manifesting a con-
gressional purpose wholly to exempt labor unions from the Sherman Act. Duplex
Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 .. .; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone
Cutters' Assn., 274 U.S. 37 .... In those cases labor unions had engaged in a
secondary boycott; they had boycotted dealers, by whom the union members were
not employed, because those dealers insisted on selling goods produced by the
employers with whom the unions had an existing controversy over terms and con-
ditions of employment. This Court held that the Clayton Act exempted labor union
activities only insofar as those activities were directed against the employees' im-
mediate employers and that controversies over the sale of goods by other dealers did
not constitute 'labor disputes' within the meaning of the Clayton Act
"Again the unions went to Congress. They protested against this Court's inter-
pretation, repeating the arguments they had made against application of the
Sherman Act to them. Congress adopted their viewpoint, at least in large part,
and in order to escape the effect of the Duplex and Bedford decisions, passed the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Star. 70.... That Act greatly broadened the meaning
this Court had attributed to the words 'labor dispute,' further restricted the use of
injunctions in such a dispute, and emphasized the public importance under modern
economic conditions of protecting the rights of employees to organize into unions
and to engage in 'concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid and protection.' This congressional purpose found further ex-
pression in the Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 .... (325 U.S. at 805).
8 In Hunt v. Cramboch, 325 U.S. 821, (1945), the Supreme Court upheld
the right of a union to prohibit employment of its members by an interstate motor
carrier for no reason other than the union had a grudge against the motor carrier,
which was thereby forced out of business. In quoting from Frankfurter's decision in
19651
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This accords to the views of Judge Stanley N. Barnes, who while
Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, stated
that commercial restraints by unions may be subject to the antitrust laws:
[F]irst, where the union engages in fraud or violence, and in the
language of the Apex court, is intent on 'suppressing (commercial]
competition, or fixing prices' of commercial products; second,
where the union activity is not in the course of a 'labor dispute'
within the meaning of Norris-LaGuardia (bearing on definition of
this term, moreover, the recent Hawaiian Tuna Packers and Colum-
bia River Packers cases suggest that courts may infer Congressional
intent to cover those labor activities not sanctioned by Taft-Hartley
which aim at direct commercial restraint); and finally, as Allen-
Bradley indicates, antitrust may come into play where a union com-
bines with some commercial restraint
EFFECT OF THE WAGNER AND TAFT-HARTLEY ACTS
Labor's exemption from the antitrust laws apparently underwent no
change as a result of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts. However, with
these acts, Congress adopted an administrative approach to the labor
management problem.
Before passage of the Wagner Act in 1935, Congress had been
content to remove judicial controls (injunctions) from labor manage-
ment controversies. With the Wagner Act, however, Congress initiated
administrative regulation of the employer by prohibiting employer inter-
ference with the organizational tactics of labor unions. Labor was in the
period of its greatest organizational expansion. As previously explained,
one of its most successful tactics was the suppression of competition
from non-union made goods. This was often accomplished through the
employment of a consumer boycott (secondary boycott), which restrained
the Hutcheson case, the Court stated: "Moreover, 'So long as a union acts in its
self-interest and does not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit
under §20 are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or
unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end
of which the particular union activities are the means'." (325 U.S. at 825).
This decision contained a violent dissent by Justice Jackson, who stated that
the purpose of the union (carrying out a grudge) was "such as to remove the
union's activities from the protection of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts."(325 U.S. at 828). Jackson further stated, "with this decision, the labor movement
has come a full circle....
"Strikes aimed at compelling the employer to yield to union demands are
not within the Sherman Act. Here the employer has yielded, and the union has
achieved the end to which all legitimate union pressure is directed and limited.
The union cannot consistently with the Sherman Act refuse to enjoy the fruits of
its victory and deny peace terms to an employer who has unconditionally sur-
rendered." (325 U.S. at 830-831).29Reprint of statement of Judge Stanley N. Barnes before New York State
Bar Association on January 26, 1956, in LAB. L. J., March 1956, p. 136.
These views were substantially restated by Assistant Attorney General Victor
R. Hansen on January 30, 1958, in an address before the New York State Bar
Association.
[Vol 2, No. 1
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interstate commerce and, until the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, was not immune under the Sherman Act
With the Wagner Act, however, Congress abandoned its "hands
off" attitude and actively intervened on the part of labor. This was
accomplished by defining a series of "unfair labor practices", which were
applicable only to employers- not to employees. Enforcement was
placed with the National Labor Relations Board, an administrative
agency. Largely because of this favorable legislation, plus the organiza-
tional activities of the CIO, industry-wide organization in the key in-
dustries was accomplished. This period of the labor movement is now
mainly accomplished history.
Congress in 1947 passed the Taft-Hartley Act and revised the one-
sided approach of the Wagner Act. This was accomplished by making
the employer "unfair labor practices" applicable also to unions (in order
to prevent union coercion of employees) and by defining a series of
"unfair labor practices" specifically applicable to unions.' In addition,
the Taft-Hartley Act contains an emergency injunction procedure, where-
by a strike, which "imperils the national health and safety," can be re-
strained for a period of 80 days.?'
One section of the Taft-Hartley Act [Section 8(b)(4)] prohibits
union pressure against an employer through his employees, which is
designed to influence the employer to stop dealing with or handling the
products of a third party. It would appear that Congress intended to
outlaw the secondary boycott.' However, the Court subsequently in-
30 Sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) as
amended by the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) contain
these provisions. They are codified in 29 U.S.C. 157 and 158. These provisions have
been amended further by Section 704, subsections (a), (b) and (c) of Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act).
3' 29 U.S.C. 178 et seq.32 1n discussing the legislative intent of the boycott provisions of the Taft-
Hartley Act, "The report of the Attorney General's National Committee to study the
Antitrust Laws" states:
"Against this bakground of possible avenues for antitrust suits, Congress
in 1947 considered amendments to the National Labor Relations Act. The
bill passed by the House, the Conference Committee Report notes, "contained
a provision amending the Clayton Act so as to withdraw the exemption of labor
organizations under the antitrust laws when such organization engaged in
combination or conspiracy in restraint of commerce where one of the purposes
or a necessary effect of the combination or conspiracy was to join or combine
with any person to fix prices, allocate costs, restrict production, distribution,
or competition, or impose restrictions or conditions, upon the purchase, sale, or use
of any product, material, machine, or equipment, or to engage in any unlawful
concerted activity." Explaining ommission of such provisions from the enacted Bill,
the Conference Report continued: "Since the matters dealt with in this Section
have to a large measure been effectuated through the use of boycotts, and since the
conference agreement contains effective provisions directly dealing with boycotts
themselves, this provision is omitted from the conference agreement." The so-called
boycott provisions provide in relevant part that "it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents to engage in, or to induce or encourage the
employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to ... handle or work on any ... materials ... or to
perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring ... any
employer or other person to cease using ... or otherwise dealing in the products
of any other producer ... or to cease doing business with any other person..."
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terpreted the so-called "boycott provisions" as not prohibiting the bring-
ing of direct pressure against either the "secondary" employer or against
employees individually. In effect, this interpretation permitted unions
to continue the employment of boycott tactics and became known as
the "secondary boycott loop hole" of Section 8(b)(4).
The Taft-Hartley Act also was ineffective in preventing "hot cargo"
agreements between employers and the union and in preventing "recog-
nition" or "organizational" picketing of employers already organized and
under contract with a rival union.
LANDRUM-GRIFFIN AMENDMENTS
The Landrum-Griffin Act by defining additional "unfair labor prac-
tices" prohibits several union abuses which could have the effect of re-
straining interstate commerce. Section 704(a) of the Landrum-Griffin
Act was intended to close the "secondary boycott loop hole" by dearly
prohibiting the coercion of "secondary" employers or the individual in-
ducing of employees to participate in a secondary boycott (ceasing to do
business with the "primary" employer).Y Section 704(b) of the Landrum-
Griffin Act makes it an unfair labor practice for unions and employers
(except in the construction and garment industries) to enter into "hot
cargo" agreements.' In addition, Section 704(c) prohibits "organizationar'
or "recognition" picketing (a) where a rival union has already been law-
fully recognized by the employer, (b) where a valid election has been
held during the last twelve months, or (c) where, apart from the two
foregoing circumstances, the picketing union has not filed an election
petition within a reasonable time (not more than thirty days after the
commencement of the picketing),u
Although the Wagner, Taft-Hartley, and Landrum-Griffin Acts
neither enlarged nor diminished the labor antitrust exemption, they are
essential to any consideration of union activity which results in a re-
straint on interstate commerce.
First, the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts represent a departure from
the philosophy of the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts (removal of
injunctive controls over labor disputes) to a system of administrative
regulation.
or "(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees
in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than
to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or class .. "
Moreover, it further provides that "Whoever shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of any violation" of these provisions "may sue therefore ...
and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit." (Page301).31 Section 704 (a) amends Section 8(b) (4) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.34Section 704(b) adds subsection (e) to Section 8 of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended. Section 704 (a) amends section 8(b) (4) (A), making
it an unfair labor practice for a union to induce an individual or to threaten, coerce,
or restrain an employer to enter into hot cargo agreements prohibited by section
8(e).
3 Section 704(c) amends Section 8(b) (7) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended.
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Second, the provisions of the Wagner, Taft-Hartley and Landrum-
Griffin Acts which define "unfair labor practices" growing out of a
"labor dispute," practically speaking, now regulate the permissive area
of union management strife?'
Third, the Landrum-Griffin Act has extended the coverage of the
Taft-Hartley Act (unfair labor practices) to prohibit some of the re-
straint-of-commerce union tactics which are exempt from the Sherman
Act. Although these practices are still immune from the Sherman Act,
they are now prohibited as "unfair labor practices."
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Recent cases involving combinations and conspiracies between unions
and non-labor groups have not departed from the ground rules laid down
in the Allen Bradley case. Two of these cases are pending review in
the Supreme Court. In Pennington -v. United Mine Workers of America,'
the Sixth Circuit held that a conspiracy between the United Mine
Workers and large coal operators to exclude small operators by increas-
ing wages, plus stock ownership in the major companies by the union,
was a violation of the Sherman Act. Similarly, in Jewel Tea Company,
Inc. v. Associated Food Retailers of Greater Chicago, Inc,,' the Seventh
Circuit held that a union-employer agreement restricting the marketing
hours during which fresh meat could be sold was not an agreement per-
taining to conditions of employment. Rather, it was an agreement de-
signed to interfere with the operation of a retail business engaged in
handling products in interstate commerce.
Under the Landrum-Griffin amendments, the Supreme Court has
continued to consider the particular labor practice made illegal without
regard to whether the conduct results in a restraint of interstate com-
merce. In National Labor Relations Board v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers
and Warehouse Local 760,"9 the Supreme Court held that peaceful picket-
ing at secondary sites (retail stores) for the purpose of persuading cus-
tomers to cease buying products of the struck employers (fruit packers)
was not a violation of the secondary boycott provision of the Act.
The Court interpreted the legislative history of the Act to show
that Congress was not concerned "with consumer picketing beyond ...
the 'isolated evil' of its use to cut off the business of a secondary em-
ployer as a means of forcing him to stop doing business with the primary
employer."4 Rather than being concerned with the economic impact of
union conduct, the Court was concerned with the specific conduct Con-
z6 The labor dispute definition of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was subsequently
carried over into the Wagner Act. The Taft-Hartley Act narrowed to some extent
the employees subject to the protection of the Act. (Supervisory employees were
eliminated.)
37 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963) Certiorari granted 377 U.S. 929, (1964).
3 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964). Certiorari granted - U.S. -, 33 LAW
WnEre 3128.
39377 U.S. 58 (1964).41 Id. at 68.
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gress intended to outlaw'
This case classically illustrates the difference in the antitrust or
effect-on-commerce approach and the labor-management approach to
union conduct.
CONCLUSION
Thus, the antitrust exemption which Congress bestowed by the
Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts, and which labor enjoyed to the
fullest under the Wagner Act, has been limited by the Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin Acts. This has been accomplished not by limiting the
antitrust exemption, but by legislation defining and prohibiting specified
unfair labor practices which Congress considered socially unacceptable.
41 Thus, in concluding, the Court stated, 'While any diminution in Safeway's
purchases of apples due to a drop in consumer demand might be said to be a result
which causes respondent's picketing to fall literally within the statutory prohibition,
'it is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet
not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of
the makers.' (Citing cases.) When consumer picketing is employed only to per-
suade customers not to buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined
to the primary dispute. The site of the appeal is expanded to include the premises
of the secondary employer, but if the appeal succeeds, the secondary employer's
purchases from the struck firms are decreased only because the public has diminished
its purchases of the struck product. On the other hand, when consumer picketing
is employed to persuade customers not to trade at all with the secondary employer,
the latter stops buying the struck product, not because of a falling demand, but in
response to pressure designed to inflict injury on his business generally. In such
case, the union does more than merely follow the struck product; it creates a
separate dispute with the secondary employer." 377 U.S. at 71-72.
[Vol. 2, No. 1
13
Crabtree: The Antitrust Exemption of Labor Unions Considered in Conjunction
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1965
